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I. Introduction
After decades of near total deference to Agency discretion, in United States v. Caronia,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit applied first amendment doctrine and concluded
that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation of off-label promotion of approved
drug products unconstitutionally restricted pharmaceutical manufacturers’ freedom of speech.1
The court got it wrong. Regulation of off-label promotion by drug manufacturers is essential to
maintaining the effectiveness of the prior-approval drug regulatory system which is the backbone
of FDA’s ability to protect the public, incentivize research, and provide the public with science
based, accurate, and reliable information. Pharmaceutical companies should be prohibited from
promoting off-label claims. Restriction of off-label promotion comports with congressional
intent, FDA mission, and sound public health policy. Despite recent judicial activism, this
enforcement tool should not be diluted.
Nonetheless, there are potentially significant reasons to consider allowing manufacturers
to engage in off-label promotion. Physician prescribing of off-label uses is common practice, is
not illegal, and is necessary to meet the standard of care in certain therapeutic areas. In addition,
Medicare allows reimbursement for essential uses of drugs which are off-label as long as they
have been published in official compendia, even though they have not been approved through the
NDA process.2 So, when an off-label use has been so established as to become the standard of
care, why shouldn’t pharmaceutical companies be allowed to promote it? It is undeniable that
pharmaceutical manufacturers have a First Amendment protected right to freedom of speech but
public health policy requires that we override that right to ensure the greater good of protecting
the health and safety of the public.
1
2

United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1396(r) – 8(k)(6).
1

This article explores statutory construction, legislative intent, case law, and public health
policy in concluding that the answer to the dilemma of off-label promotion is not to reverse
course and provide what essentially amounts to an exclusion for pharmaceutical manufacturers
from the requirement to prove safety and efficacy of drugs prior to marketing. The answer is for
manufacturers to embrace options the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and FDA
Guidance already provide for relying on less than usual access to clinical data or detailed study
reports, or on studies with alternative, less intensive quality control/on-site monitoring, to gain
approval for off-label uses. This will advance greater visibility of the use and provide objective,
science-based, reliable information to doctors and patients at point of use in the approved
labeling where it will do most good.
II. The Prior-Approval Drug Regulatory System
In 1930 Congress created the FDA and authorized them to enforce the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906.3 Prior to this enabling Act there was minimal regulation of the
pharmaceutical industry and no requirement for determining the safety or efficacy of drug
products before introducing them into interstate commerce.4 Consequently, the market was
flooded with “snake oils” which at best perpetrated fraud on the public and at worst caused
serious adverse events and death.5 It wasn’t until the “Elixir of Sulfanilamide” poisonings of
1937 which killed 107 people, many of them children, from use of a cough syrup formulated
with a deadly industrial solvent, that safety standards were adopted for all human drugs.6 This
tragedy prompted the passage of the FDCA of 1938 requiring safety testing of all human drugs
3

Brochure: The History of Drug Regulation in the United States;
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/FOrgsHistory/CDER/CenterforDrugEvaluationandRe
searchBrochureandChronology/ucm114470.htm.
4
“Milestones in Food and Drug Law History”
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm.
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prior to marketing.7 While a step in the right direction, the near approval of thalidomide (which
caused birth defects in thousands of children in Germany and England) in the U.S. led to the
enactment of the 1962 amendments which strengthened the safety requirements and added the
requirement for efficacy testing before marketing.8
Pursuant to the FDCA, the FDA devised and implemented a system designed to ensure
drugs are proven safe and effective before being put into interstate commerce.9 The backbone of
the prior-approval system of drug regulation is the Investigational New Drug (IND) and New
Drug Application (NDA) regulations which require that pharmaceutical manufacturing
companies establish the safety and efficacy of new drug products through a rigorous program of
in in-vitro, pre-clinical in-vivo (animal), and clinical (human) studies.10,11 These include
toxicology, pharmacology, and drug-drug interaction studies, for example, to establish the riskbenefit profile of a drug product for its intended use.12 The IND/NDA process facilitates the
early identification of drugs that aren’t safe and effective and ensures that they do not get to
market. For example, in 2003, Glaxo-Smithkline halted a clinical trial on the safety and efficacy
of long acting beta agonists because a statistically significant number of patients on the drug died
from asthma related deaths.13
The FDCA prohibits manufacturers from marketing drugs which have not been deemed
safe and effective through the NDA prior-approval process.14 Pursuant to the FDCA, to support

7

Id.
Id.
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21 CFR § 312; 21 CFR § 314.
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Id., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505 (21 U.S.C. § 355).
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United States ‘Complaint at 44, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline, no. 11-10398-RWZ (D. Mass. Oct.26,
2011).
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 301(d), 505(a) [21 U.S .C . §§ 331(d), 355(a)].
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approval, an NDA must include “adequate data and information on the drug’s safety” and
“substantial evidence of effectiveness.”15 The FDCA mandates the submission of full reports of
investigations to meet these requirements. Depending on the type of data however, a
manufacturer may chose to file their request for approval of a new drug under either a 505(b)(1)
application or a 505(b)(2) application.16 A 505(b)(1) application includes full reports of
investigations sponsored by the applicant along with the actual data supporting safety and
effectiveness.17 A 505(b)(2) application includes full reports of investigations that are not
sponsored by the applicant but are provided by reference to data generated by someone else.18
For example, published literature reports may be used in a 505(b)(2) application to support safety
and efficacy.19
An applicant may also gain approval for a new indication, or different manner of use, for
an already approved drug product through the Supplemental New Drug Application (SNDA)
process.20 Much of the data supporting approval of a SNDA may be included by reference to the
data submitted in the original NDA and only data and information about the new indication or
manner of use need be generated and included.21
When approval for a new indication or different manner of use for an already approved
drug product is not sought, information about those potentially beneficial uses is disseminated to
the medical community by inclusion in compendia, journal articles, and textbooks.22 These uses

15
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §505(b)(1) [21 U.S.C § 505(b)(1)].
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §505(b)(2) [21 U.S.C § 505(b)(2)].
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“Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999.
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm
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are also disseminated via discussion at independent symposia, educational sessions, and
professional meetings.23 Finally, knowledge about these uses is spread by off-label promotion.24
It has been suggested that dissemination via compendia, journal articles, textbooks independent
symposia, educational sessions, and professional meetings are better than relying on
manufacturer’s off-label promotion for a variety of reasons and FDA in fact prohibits
dissemination by off-label promotion.25 Post NDA approval, advertising and promotion of an
approved drug product for a use that is not identical to that in an effective (i.e. approved) NDA
undermines the prior-approval drug regulatory scheme because the safety and efficacy of the offlabel use has not been established through the rigorous process established by the FDA pursuant
to the FDCA.
Recognizing the need for oversight of manufacturers’ off-label promotion activities,
Congress amended the FDCA Act in 1962 and gave FDA the authority to regulate the
advertising and promotion of prescription drug products as well.26 This was a response, in part,
to Congressional concerns that doctors could not adequately evaluate frequently misleading
claims by drug manufacturers without a body of objective, reliable information.27 Pursuant to
this authority, FDA provided criteria for appropriate advertising and promotion and prohibited
the advertising and promotion of drugs for any use other than that subject to an effective NDA.28

23

Id.
Id.
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Guidance for Industry: Responding to Unsolicited requests for Off-Label Information about
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices; Draft 2011 at 2.
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“Milestones in Food and Drug Law History”
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm.
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“Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A.,FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999.
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24

5

Advertising violates the FDCA if it is false or misleading, fails to provide fair balance, and/or
fails to reveal material facts.29
Off-label promotion is the promotion of a drug for a use or uses that have not been
approved by the FDA as safe and effective. These may include, for example, claims for the use
of a drug to treat a different condition, to treat a different population of patients, or to be used
according to a different dosing regimen. To ensure successful patient outcomes, advertising and
promotional material must accurately state what condition the drug is approved for and how to
use it correctly. The safety and efficacy of use for any other condition or in any other way is
unknown and puts the public at risk.
FDA’s mission is not limited to protecting the public health by assuring the safety and
efficacy of drugs.30 It is also to advance the public health by speeding innovations that make
medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.31 Moreover, it aims to help the public
obtain accurate, science-based information they need to use drugs effectively.32 Prohibiting drug
manufacturers’ off-label promotion is essential to achieving each of these three goals. It ensures
the integrity and effectiveness of the prior-approval drug regulatory system which is the
backbone of the FDA’s ability to protect the public by keeping unsafe and ineffective drugs off
the market; advances the public health by incentivizing the generation of accurate science-based
information on safety and efficacy, and helps patients get the accurate, science-based information
they need to use drugs to maintain and improve their health.33

29

Id.
Statement of FDA Mission;
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM29833
1.pdf.
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III. Public Health Policy
Public health policy suggests that off-label promotion be regulated to ensure viability of
the prior-approval drug regulatory system. When the prior-approval drug regulatory system is
circumvented and manufacturers are allowed to advertise and promote at will, human tragedy
often ensues. Based on the amount of money the pharmaceutical industry expends on promotion
and advertising, it’s undisputed that promotion and advertising are extremely effective vehicles
for increasing the use of drug products.34
The global tobacco epidemic is a direct result of circumventing the prior-approval drug
regulatory system and allowing advertising and promotion to go unregulated. Based on the
FDCA, the FDA defines the term “drug” as articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, and articles intended to affect the structure or
function of the body. It defines “new drugs” as any drug not generally recognized among
qualified experts as safe and effective and subjects them to the prior-approval requirements of
the FDCA.35 Even though Tobacco companies strategically don’t make drug claims for their
products today, they have long touted a variety of health claims and disease states treated by
smoking. Early ads included claims for weight loss (“To Keep a Slender Figure”), as well as
asthma and other diseases of the mouth, throat, and lungs (Dr. Batty’s).36,37 Many ads indirectly
promoted the benefits of smoking by featuring doctors (“More Doctors Smoke Camels”).38

34

Big Pharma Spends More On Advertising Than Research And Development, Study Finds, Jan.7, 2008
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm.
35
21 U.S.C § 201(g)(1)
36
“When smoking was good for you! Advertisers used to claim cigarettes would keep women slim and
beautiful”; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2107969/When-smoking-good-Advertisers-usedclaim-cigarettes-women-slim.html#ixzz2QU21DZmJ
37
Advertisement: “Dr. Batty’s For Your Health Asthma Cigarettes”
38
Advertisement: “More Doctors Smoke Camels”
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Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that tobacco products affect the structure or function of the
body.39 Thus, tobacco products should have fallen under the rubric of the FDCA of 1938. Even
though the Court in Brown & Williamson concluded that tobacco is not a drug, and thus not
subject to the FDCA, Congress subsequently passed the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act (TCA) granting FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products.40,41 This
authority covers the content, marketing and sale of tobacco products and requires manufacturers
to seek approval for any new tobacco products.42 From that standpoint, the TCA is remarkably
similar in scope to the FDCA. Global consumption of cigarettes has risen steadily since they
were introduced at the beginning of the 20th Century.43 Scientific evidence has shown that all
forms of tobacco cause health problems which frequently result in death or disability and no
other consumer product is as dangerous or deadly.44 The global tobacco epidemic is a clear
example of the result that ensues when the prior-approval drug regulatory system is
circumvented and advertising and promotion goes unregulated. Had Congress and the Courts
accepted tobacco products as drugs and subjected them to FDA regulation sooner, this massive
public health tragedy would have been averted because tobacco product manufacturers would
have had to provide adequate data and information on their products’ safety. This data readily
would have revealed the dangerous side effects from use of tobacco products and led to their
prohibition.

39

Knut-Olaf Haustein, Tobacco or Health?: Physiological and Social Damages Caused by Tobacco
Smoking; (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York) 2001.
40
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
41
P.L. 111-31 (2009); 21 U.S.C. 301.
42
Id.
43
Dr. Judith Mackay, Dr. Mihael Eriksen, The Tobacco Atlas (World Health Organization) 2002.
44
Id.
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A number of other off-label drug uses have resulted in tragic consequences from
circumventing the prior-approval drug regulatory system.45 These include off-label use of drugs
to treat AIDS, life threatening arrhythmias, angina and hypertension, and post operative pain.46
In a desperate attempt to stem the AIDS epidemic, the drug ddC was manufactured, sold
and used before clinical trials were conducted to assess its safety and efficacy. The studies
revealed that those using ddC as initial therapy had a death rate at least twice as high as patients
on AZT, the drug already approved for the treatment of AIDS.47
In another example, the drugs encainide and flecainide were used off-label to prevent
increased mortality of heart attack victims who had high levels of ventricular premature
complexes.48 Although the use was unstudied and unapproved it was supported in some
published peer-reviewed journal articles.49 When the value of this therapy began to be suspected,
the National Institutes of Health conducted clinical studies and discovered that the death rate of
patients on the combination was more than twice the rate of patients on placebo.50
Another example includes the widespread off-label use of calcium channel blockers,
instead of beta blockers, in post-heart attack patients which was fostered by publications that
could be interpreted as supportive.51 Instead of helping, this off-label use likely cost thousands of
lives each year.52
45

“Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999.
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm.
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Id.
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“Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999.
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm.
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A final example is the risk of serious, life-threatening, respiratory depression associated
with the off-label use of the fentanyl patch for post-operative pain which was based on a number
of publications describing the patch as safe and effect for that use.53 Without a comprehensive
review of these publications and any other data available, it is unclear whether these publications
would have been adequate in terms of quantity and quality to support FDA approval of this
indication. For sure though, we would know the answer to that question had the manufacturer
collected the data available and submitted it to the FDA for review. Without this no one would
be able to say how much more data, if any, would be needed to support or dispute the safety and
efficacy of this off-label use.
In sum, protection of off-label promotion as a first amendment right circumvents the
NDA prior-approval process and exposes patients to treatments which have not been vetted
through the NDA prior-approval process. This brings us full circle back to pre-1906 when drugs
were considered commodities and sold as any other commercial good. History has shown this
results in human tragedy. These tragedies trumpet that from a public policy standpoint, society’s
right to freedom from unsafe or ineffective drugs must trump manufacturer’s right to free speech.
IV. Freedom of Speech
In United States v. Caronia, a sales representative responsible for detailing the drug
Xyrem® to physicians for cataplexy (weak or paralyzed muscles caused by narcolepsy) promoted
the drug for insomnia, fibromyalgia, restless leg syndrome, Parkinson’s disease and Multiple
Sclerosis as well.54 The FDA charged Caronia with intent to introduce a misbranded drug into
interstate commerce (because it lacked adequate directions for its off-label intended use) but the
53
54

Id.
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012)
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court decided he was being prosecuted for his speech in violation of the First Amendment and
applied First Amendment doctrine instead.55
A. First Amendment Doctrine & Caronia Analysis
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from making any law
that abridges the freedom of speech.56 While bribery, perjury, and anti-trust conspiracies are not
protected, and political speech is well protected, commercial speech has historically been less
protected allowing some restrictions to be deemed constitutional.57 It was not until Central
Hudson was decided in 1980 that commercial speech first received First Amendment
protection.58 In Central Hudson, commercial speech was analyzed under a heightened scrutiny
standard.59 Subsequent to Central Hudson, in 1985, Zauderer was decided which provides for
some types of commercial speech to be analyzed pursuant to a normal scrutiny standard.60
Under normal scrutiny, the Zauderer Test (rational basis) is applied.61 To survive a
constitutional challenge under Zauderer, the speech must be purely factual and uncontroversial,
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception, and not unjustified or unduly
burdensome.62 Zauderer applies to speech which the government forces a company to make in
order to prevent deception as is the case with certain required warnings and disclosures.63 The
Court in Caronia did not apply Zauderer because the speech restricted was voluntary commercial
55

Id.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
57
Ralph F. Hall, FDA, Caronia and the 1st Amendment, FDLI Annual Conference 2013;
http://www.fdli.org/docs/default-document-library/hall_2013new.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
58
Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. 557.
59
Id.
60
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626.
61
R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
62
Id.
63
Id.
56
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speech. One could well posit that the failure to include adequate directions for its off-label
intended use amounted to the failure to make a disclosure compelled by law and thus apply
Zauderer but the Court did not do so in this case.64
Under heightened scrutiny, either the Central Hudson Test or the Strict Scrutiny Test is
applied.65 Pursuant to Central Hudson, to determine if the speech deserves protection, the speech
must not be misleading or about an illegal activity, and the government must prove that its
asserted interest is substantial, the restriction directly and materially advances the states’ interest,
and the restriction is narrowly tailored.66 To survive a constitutional challenge under Strict
Scrutiny, the government must prove that their interest is compelling, the restricted speech is
vital to advancing their interest, and the restriction is narrowly tailored.67 Voluntary commercial
speech is typically analyzed under heightened scrutiny.68
In analyzing Caronia, the Court followed the First Amendment analysis and decision in
Sorrell V. IMS Health.69 In SorrelI, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that speech in aid of
pharmaceutical marketing is a form of free expression protected by the First Amendment.70
Sorrell stands for the premise that a law which imposes a restriction on content and speaker
based speech that is subject to heightened scrutiny is presumed invalid unless it is justified in
light of a substantial government interest.71 The Caronia panel found the speech was content
based because it permitted on-label promotion but prohibited off-label promotion, and speaker

64

Frank Pasquale, Seton Hall Law AWR Comments, Spring 2013.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (Foundation Press) 2010.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct.2653 (2011).
70
Id.
71
Id.
65
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based because it applied only to pharmaceutical companies and not to doctors or anyone else.72
Because the restricted speech was voluntary commercial speech the Court applied heightened
scrutiny. Using the Central Hudson test, they found that the restriction did not meet the third (the
restriction must advance a substantial government interest) or fourth prong (the restriction must
be narrowly tailored) and concluded that FDA’s restriction of pharmaceutical manufacturers’
off-label promotion speech was unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.73
Paramount to this finding, however, is the assumption made by the court a priori that the speech
was truthful.
B. The Sorrell Analysis
Before getting to the Sorrell analysis, it’s important to note, that the Court in Caronia did
not address certain critical issues before applying First Amendment doctrine. First, the court
decided that Caronia was prosecuted for his speech, but the charge was misbranding, and his
speech was only used as evidence to prove misbranding (intent to ship a misbranded drug in
interstate commerce.)74 Under the FDCA, a drug is misbranded if it lacks adequate directions for
lay use.75 By definition, the legal status of a drug is “over-the-counter” unless it is impossible
for adequate directions for lay use to be created.76 When it is impossible to create adequate
directions for lay use, the legal status is “prescription” and it is exempted from the requirements
for adequate directions as long as the intended use is the same as that approved in an NDA.77

72

United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012).
Id.
74
Id, Dissent at 172.
75
21 C.F.R. § 352.
76
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 503(b)(1) [21 USC § 353(b)(1)].
77
Id.
73
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Thus, a drug is misbranded if it is labeled, advertised, or promoted for a use that is not the same
as the labeling in the approved NDA.78
In Sorrell, Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law was challenged and found to have
unconstitutionally burdened the speech of pharmaceutical marketers and data miners without
adequate justification.79 With the goal of protecting patient privacy, this law prohibited
pharmaceutical manufacturers from using prescriber-identifying information for marketing
purposes.80 In Sorrell the law was discriminatory because it only restricted manufacturers’ use of
the data while others were allowed to use the data even though they too could compromise
patient privacy.81
Sorrell is distinguishable from Caronia because in Sorrell, the VT law that restricted use
of prescriber-identifiable data in promotional activities by pharmaceutical manufacturers targeted
speech directly.82 In Caronia, the conviction was based on the use of speech as evidence to prove
intended use which does not even implicate the First Amendment. Thus, First Amendment
doctrine should not have been applied at all.83
The Caronia Panel also based its conclusion on a characterization of the restricted speech
as speaker and content based.84 The speech, however, was not content based because off-label

78

Pursuant to section 503(b)(1) of the Act, [21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)], a prescription drug is not safe for use
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug. By definition, a
prescription drug's directions for use are not adequate to enable a layperson to safely use the drug for
its intended uses. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. Consequently, failing to bear adequate directions for use
pursuant to section 502(f)(1) of the Act, [21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1)] and lacking an approved application, the
drug not exempt from 21 C. F.R. § 201.115 and is therefore misbranded.
79
Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct.2653 (2011).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2012).
84
Id.
14

promotion is restricted for all drugs, not just particular drugs, and it was not speaker based
because off-label promotion is restricted for all manufacturers, not just particular manufacturers.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are the only actors that FDA regulates so it’s incorrect to conclude
that they were discriminated against while doctors were not because doctors aren’t in the
universe of actors regulated by FDA.
Nonetheless, pursuant to the Sorrell analysis, the court concluded that the law restricting
off-label was presumptively invalid and it looked to the Central Hudson Test to determine if was
justified in light of the government interest involved.85 Pursuant to Caronia, the test for
justifying the restriction of commercial speech in the food and drug law realm now appears to be
a sequential Sorrell – Central Hudson Test.
C. The Central Hudson Test Analysis
Under the Central Hudson test, to be protected, the speech must be truthful, not
misleading, and not about an illegal activity. If the speech is protected, a restriction is justified
only if it supports a substantial government interest, directly advances that interest to a material
degree, and is narrowly drawn and not more extensive than needed.86
1. The First Prong
Applying the first prong of the Central Hudson Test we find there is no question that the
activity promoted, off-label drug use, is not illegal (doctors can prescribe off-label uses of drugs
for patients under their care and patients can use drugs off-label). Off-label promotion, however,
is inherently misleading. Off-label promotion implies that a drug is safe and effective for a

85

Id.
Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. 557.

86
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particular use when the pharmaceutical manufacturer doesn’t really know. While the
promotional information may be true, and the use truly safe and effective, by statutory definition,
the speech is misleading because the use hasn’t been proven safe and effective according the
criteria set out in the FDCA. Thus, doctors may be relying on misleading information when they
conclude that an off-label use is safe and effective enough to prescribe to their patients. Pursuant
to the statute, safe and effective means that 1) the use is subject to an effective NDA; 2) the NDA
includes full reports of investigations containing “adequate data and information” on the drugs’
safety and “substantial evidence” of effectiveness (for that use), 3) the data and information was
assessed by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and
effectiveness of the drug for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested, 4)
the benefit of the drug use was determined to be greater than the risk, and 5) labeling is available
(for that use) which is “adequate” to explain what the drug is intended for and the risks and
benefits of using it for that condition.87 Thus, for an off-label use, where the manufacturer hasn’t
meet the statutory requirements for deeming it safe and effective, the speech is inherently
misleading and it must fail the first prong of the Central Hudson Test. This means that the speech
is not protected under the Constitution and the government can restrict it without scrutiny.
Congress expressly defined safety and effectiveness in the FDCA.88 They recognized that no
drug is ever one hundred percent safe and effective, and thus set the standard for safety and
effectiveness based on scientific evidence. Had Congress wanted to leave the standard for
determining the safety and efficacy of drugs up to manufacturers, they would not have expressly
defined it, and would not have authorized FDA to enforce it.

87
88

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505 (21 U.S.C. § 355).
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505 (21 U.S.C. § 355).
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Nonetheless, the court in Caronia assumed the speech was truthful (in part, because the
government did not make the assertion that it was not.)89 The Court stated that, prohibiting offlabel promotion “paternalistically interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive
potentially relevant treatment information” and thereby “could inhibit, to the public’s detriment,
informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”90 To the contrary, banning off-label promotion
prevents doctors and patients from being mislead with potentially false information. The court
also claimed that the FDCA contemplated off-label drug use.91 This may be true but the FDCA
most likely did not contemplate off-label promotion, or that manufacturers would circumvent the
system by promoting off-label uses without going through the approval system. It’s fair to say
that Congress presupposed that manufacturers would follow the process lest they wouldn’t have
legislated it and authorized FDA to enforce it.
2. The Second Prong
The government’s substantial interest in prohibiting off-label promotion is self-evident
and the Court easily established that the second prong was satisfied. They found the government
did have a substantial interest in “preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug
approval process, and an interest in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.” 92
3. The Third Prong
Pursuant to the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the government may restrict
speech if it directly advances their substantial interest to a material degree.93 The FDA has a

89

United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. 557.
90
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substantial interest in banning off-label promotion to achieve its tri-fold objectives: protect the
public from harm from unsafe and ineffective drugs, advance the public health by supporting
innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and affordable, and help the public get
accurate, science based information needed to use drugs successfully. Banning off-label
promotion directly advances the Government’s interest in a material way because off-label
promotion circumvents the prior-approval drug regulatory system which thereby 1) exposes
patients to risk of harm from unsafe and ineffective drugs because FDA is robbed of the
opportunity to keep unsafe drugs off the market; 2) suppresses innovation by allowing
manufacturers to market drugs without first proving safety and efficacy thereby muting the
incentive to generate accurate science based information and 3) prevents the public from get
getting accurate, science base information because none will be generated.94 Without needing to
file an NDA, manufacturers have no incentive to conduct innovative research. Without
conducting research, manufacturers don’t have the information necessary for an adequate
assessment of the drug’s safety and efficacy for the promoted off-label use. Without an objective
assessment by qualified experts, the information provided by manufacturers cannot be complete,
unbiased or reliable. Incomplete and biased information is inherently false and misleading.
Without consequences for false and misleading promotion, companies have no incentive to
conduct studies or collect otherwise available data and information (e.g. published literature), to
submit to FDA to definitively establish the safety and efficacy an off-label use.
To legally establish the safety and effectiveness of an off-label use, manufacturers must
meet the FDCA definition of substantial evidence which FDA has clearly interpreted and

94

“Speeches by FDA Officials” Linda A. Suydam, D.P.A., FDLI Conference Keynote Address, Sept.13, 1999.
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/SpeechArchives/ucm054540.htm.
18

described in numerous regulation and guidance.95,96 Substantial evidence typically requires full
investigations including two adequate and well controlled studies but in certain circumstances
less evidence is acceptable.97 Without generating substantial evidence, manufacturers advance
their own interests over that of the public. Off-label promoters have an inherent conflict of
interest as their primary interest is investor return. Conducting full investigations of off-label
uses is not in drug manufacturers’ best interest. To conduct these investigations, resources need
to be diverted from the study of other drugs. Diverting these resources is not justified when there
are no consequences for promoting and selling a drug for an off-label use without generating the
data. Even worse, the studies may fail thus cutting off an otherwise available revenue stream.
Likewise, compiling and assessing a comprehensive review of all of the data and information
otherwise unimpeded (i.e. published literature) about an off-label use is also not in the
company’s best interest. Again, the assessment may reveal the drug is not safe or not effective.
When pharmaceutical manufacturers can bypass the system and financially gain from off-label
uses without doing the research, the cost and risk of doing research can’t be justified from a
business perspective.
If there were consequences for false and misleading promotion, drug manufacturers
would conduct the studies or assessments needed. Positive results from these studies and
assessments would support approvals through the NDA system while negative results would
prevent promotion of those uses. In this way, and doctors and patients would get accurate science
based information and patients would be protected from using drugs in ways that have not been
shown to be safe and effective.
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Nonetheless, the Court in Caronia found the restricted speech did not meet the third
prong because it did not directly advance the government’s interest to a material degree.98 The
court reasoned that because off-label use is allowed and the speech is truthful prohibiting
manufacturers from promoting them doesn’t undermine the drug approval process nor help
reduce exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.99 Had the truthfulness of off-label promotion
been assessed in Caronia, the Court well may have found that off-label speech is not protected.
In addition, the court said “criminalizing manufacturers’ promotion of off-label use while
permitting others to promote such uses to doctors is an indirect and questionable effective means
to achieve the goal of shepherding physicians to prescribe drugs only on-label.100 The court
clearly misunderstands FDA’s goal in restricting off-label promotion. “Shepherding physicians
to prescribe drugs only on-label” is not only not the objective, it’s contrary to FDA’s goal.
FDA’s goal is to safeguarding the public, advancing the public health by encouraging innovation
in medicine, and disseminating truthful information to patients. Understanding the goal is
paramount to determining whether the means to achieve that goal is appropriate. Had the Court
recognized the correct goal, they likely would have found the means acceptable.
4. The Fourth Prong
To meet the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the restriction cannot be more extensive
than needed to advance the government policy.101 Banning of off-label promotion by
manufacturers is not more extensive than needed because drug manufacturers are the only group
restricted. Banning off-label speech across the board would be over inclusive, limit the free
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exchange of information between doctors and educational institutions, and be a disservice to
patients.102 Limiting the ban to drug manufacturers specifically targets the single group that has
inordinate incentives for distortion if they don’t participate in it.103 FDA doesn’t regulate doctors
or the public, they only regulate drug manufacturers.104 In addition, the regulations don’t
discriminate among manufacturers (i.e. all manufacturers are banned alike). Sorrell is
distinguishable because the law did not discriminate within the regulated universe of actors.105
Even the court in Sorrell conceded that “the first amendment does not prevent restrictions
directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech”.106
The Caronia Court speculated that there are numerous less restrictive means available to
meet the government’s goal.107 They suggested that if FDA is concerned that physicians may be
deceived by off-label promotion, the agency “could guide physicians and patients in
differentiating between misleading and false promotion, exaggerations and embellishments, and
truthful or non-misleading information.”108 Given FDA’s resource constraints, it’s highly
unlikely that this suggestion would be feasible, or effective.109 The Court rejected FDA’s defense
that this and other means were not administrable, feasible, or effective and said that FDA must
prove that they aren’t practical, effective, or feasible.110 Hasn’t history already proven this? The
sulfanilamide and thalidomide tragedies and the global tobacco epidemic alone support the fact
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that allowing circumvention of the prior-approval drug regulatory system and unregulated drug
advertising and promotion do not achieve the goal of protecting the public from unsafe and
ineffective drugs.111 Nonetheless, the Caronia Court found the prohibition of off-label promotion
was more extensive than needed.112 Had the Court considered the realities of the FDA’s resource
limitations and the fact that drug regulation and tragedy are inversely related, they would likely
have concluded otherwise.
In sum, it is undisputed that doctors are allowed to prescribe off-label uses under the
auspices of the practice of medicine. This allows innovative medicine to quickly get to patients
that need it without having to wait for full investigations and NDA approval. Awareness of offlabel uses is generated not only by off-label promotion but also by compendia, journal articles,
textbooks, independent symposia, professional meetings.113 Pharmaceutical manufacturers
contend that allowing off-label promotion serves doctors and their patients, and that government
regulation should not impede the practice of medicine by restricting off-label promotion. Despite
this noble endeavor pharmaceutical manufacturers have a conflict of interest. It is not FDA’s
goal to prevent ill patients’ access to drugs114. FDA’s goal is to get objective, science-based, and
reliable information about drugs to ill patients so they can use them successfully.115 Thus, despite
the fact that First Amendment doctrine should not have been applied to this case at all, the
Central Hudson test proves rather than denies that the restriction of off-label promotion is
justified whether the speech is considered truthful or not.
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V. Academia
In a review entitled, “Off-Label Prescription Advertising, The FDA and the First
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection,” the authors Klasmeier
and Redish conclude that FDA is clueless when it comes to the First Amendment and
commercial speech rights.116 Klasmeier and Redish, fail to recognize and appreciate the position
that the FDA is in. The FDCA and FDA’s mission require that FDA manage a delicate balance
between protecting the public and enhancing activities that result in scientific findings and
ensuring these scientific facts are disseminated truthfully, understandably, and without deception
to those who need them. These objectives, in tension with each other, require a delicate balance.
Klasmeier and Redish’s claim that, “FDA’s categorical prohibition of off-label use
amounts to a classic suppression of commercial speech” may be true but the Supreme Court in
Sorrell concedes that commercial speech may be restricted.117 Commercial speech is not and
should not be afforded full protection like these authors promote. The Central Hudson Test
provides the framework for the analysis to determine when commercial speech is being
unconstitutionally suppressed and when it is not.118 In the context of public health and safety,
suppression of off-label promotion is justified pursuant to Central Hudson.119
The authors’ contend that “the government cannot suppress communication completely
when the danger can be avoided by the provision of more information, rather than less” but they
fail to appreciate the fact that neither the FDA nor the manufacturer has the information to
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provide.120 If the manufacturer had adequate data and information on the safety, and substantial
evidence of effectiveness, of the off-label use they would submit it to FDA for review and
approval thereby getting the information on the drug label itself. Having the off-label use made
on-label is far more valuable to manufacturers because the new use gets much more visibility
and eliminates the expense of sales calls. In this way, when truly beneficial, the use is as
transparent as the light of day for all doctors to see – it’s no longer limited to linear
dissemination of the message from the sales rep to doctor 1, then from doctor 1 to doctor 2, etc.,
which suffers from the problem of gossip distortion as depicted in many comedic sketches of the
20th Century where the message at the end of the phone line is not the same as the message at the
beginning. In this context though, distortion of the message is not funny. In other words, getting
an off-label use on-label blasts it out of the dark ages into the new millennium of transparency
with all the benefits that come along with that, like accuracy, completeness, and reliability of the
message.
The authors state that FDA could attempt to redefine its interest more narrowly to finesse
the problems under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson. Again they fail to recognize
that FDA’s mission, as directed by Congress, is three fold and narrowing their interest would
require Congress to Amend the FDCA.121
The authors state that it is impossible to assert that the public health and safety will be
advanced by the categorical prohibition of off-label promotion because FDA allows off-label use
yet bans off-label promotion which deprives ill patients of valuable and lawful treatments for the
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simple reason that their doctors are unaware of their existence.122 They suggest that the FDA
cure their constitutional speech problem by prohibiting doctors from prescribing off-label use at
all so that conduct instead of speech is targeted.123 The authors’ logic is flawed and they miss the
point of FDA’s existence. A ban on off-label prescribing would completely deprive ill patients
from potentially beneficial treatments whereas banning the promotion of off-label uses only
shifts the speech from manufacturers who have inherent bias to independent medical and public
health organizations. Again, the authors fail to appreciate the complexity of FDAs mandate: to
prevent harm and advance health. Without undergoing rigorous scientific analysis and
evaluation, even the FDA does not know which claim is truthful and beneficial, and which not,
so from a public health standpoint they logically would not prevent the drug’s off-label use
unless it were definitively proven that it was not truthful, and harmful. Thus, if FDA prevents
off-label use, patients will suffer from lack of access to potentially valuable treatments, and if
they don’t prevent off-label use, patients will suffer from exposure to potentially harmful
treatments. Thus, either way you look at it patients suffer. From a public health ethics viewpoint,
depriving all ill patients of potentially lifesaving treatments is far worse than depriving
pharmaceutical manufacturers additional sales from off-label uses with an incidental burden on
their freedom of speech. By not generating the scientific evidence required by law under the
FDCA, pharmaceutical manufacturers have effectively forced FDA into the position of having to
allow off-label use. The authors claim that FDA is extorting manufacturers into conducting
studies when they have “absolutely no legal obligation to undertake such action” but that is
absolutely untrue.124 They, in fact, absolutely do have a legal obligation under the FDCA §
505(a) which states, “no person shall introduce into interstate commerce any new drug unless
122
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approval of an application filed pursuant to section 505 subsection (b) of (j) is effective.”125 The
law could not be clearer: before you can market a drug you must gain approval for it through the
prior-approval drug regulatory scheme which means you must provide evidence of safety and
effectiveness. To the contrary, pharmaceutical manufacturers are using the public health
argument to advance their own interest to force the FDA to let them to promote their products
without complying with the law. On the other hand, allowing doctors to prescribe off-label drug
uses generates evidence, albeit weak, about uses that manufacturers refuse to study yet don’t
refuse to profit from.
Judge Louis Brandeis realized the benefit in allowing states the liberty to be “little
laboratories” in applying policy that does not necessarily correspond with the government
viewpoint, and so does FDA.126 Where manufacturers refuse to ensure the safety and efficacy of
the drugs they promote, FDA allows individual doctors to engage in what essentially amounts to
individual research thereby advancing the public interest and FDA’s mandate to advance the
public health by encouraging innovation. If FDA were to ban off-label use, no innovation
concerning off-label uses would occur at all because manufacturers aren’t studying them and
doctors would not be able to experiment with them.
The authors also claim that FDA’s categorical ban subsumes manufacturer promotion of
uses that are not only accepted but universally recognized as extremely valuable to the
preservation of public health.127 But this argument works both ways. FDA’s categorical ban not
only subsumes the beneficial treatments but it also subsumes the harmful treatments. Without the
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ability to separate the wheat from the chaff, FDA has no choice but to sweep up the good with
the bad. Furthermore, uses that are accepted and universally recognized as beneficial would
naturally have generated a plethora of evidence in the literature to support its approval and
shouldn’t need to be promoted. In other words, if so valuable and well known, these off-label
uses should sell themselves. If manufacturers feel the need to promote these uses, they should
collect the data, submit it to the FDA and make the off-label use on-label. This is the win-win
solution that is in the best interest of the public and industry: objective, reliable, science-based
evidence on the label with full transparency so the risks and benefits can be accurately weighed,
individually at point of use.
The authors argue that FDA control of off-label use information is paternalistic and
shows a lack of respect for the “citizenry’s ability to make lawful choices on the basis of truthful
advocacy.”128 The authors fail to recognize that patients as well as their doctors are a vulnerable
population. It’s incomprehensible to think desperately ill laypersons can rationally analyze the
veracity of a manufacturer’s claim and that doctors, in their choice to prescribe an off-label use,
do so based on the information given to them via a sales representative. Any off-label use is an
experiment, conducted by a doctor based on a hypothesis generated by potentially accurate but
often incomplete and unreliable off-label promotion information, and his own and other doctors
experience, in what essentially amounts to a series of uncontrolled studies with an n-value of
one. So, it’s a vulnerable population with high stakes that warrants additional protection.
Finally, the authors claim that the FDA does not ban off-label prescribing of drugs
simply because it is too inconvenient for them and “suppression of fully protected, potentially
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valuable expression is far too high a price to pay for government convenience”.129 First, it’s
highly debatable that this speech is, or even should be, fully protected, and second, the price that
is too high to pay is for the patients who are deprived of objective, scientific based reliable
information from which to make critical decisions affecting whether they will live or not, how
long they will live, and what the quality of that experience will be. This, in contrast to
pharmaceutical manufacturers who are deprived the ability to take advantage of ill patients’
desperate needs for cures with what amounts to the modern day version of quackery - the
marketing and sale of a product without acceptable evidence for the efficacy and safety of
whatever treatments, cures, regimens, or procedures are advocated, cloaked in a douse of fairy
Godlobby dust. Congress recognized this fifty years ago when they passed the FDAC
Amendments of 1962 based in part on reports that doctors could not adequately evaluate
frequently misleading claims by drug manufacturers without a body of objective, reliable
information.130
The authors conclude that the FDA is using a hatchet to prevent all off-label promotion
when they should be using a scalpel to dissect and separate truthful from untruthful claims
thereby allowing them to prohibit only the untruthful claims.131 Well this is a job for Goliath.
Separating the wheat from the chaff in this context requires the tool of scientific evidence. Who
should pay for these tools - the U.S. taxpayers or the companies that stand to benefit from the
sales of the truthful claims which FDA has dissected from the untruthful claims with the tools
paid for by taxpayers? In any commercial world the burden is on the manufacturer to ensure their
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products are safe and effective for any conceivable use of their product. Looking through the lens
from FDA’s viewpoint, a ban on manufacturer’s off-label promotion is not bizarre at all, as the
authors suggest. It’s unfortunate that the judiciary has fallen prey to this rhetoric and overstepped
their bounds in this highly specialized area which requires deference and flexibility to support a
vital public health interest. Yes, we need someone to separate the wheat from the chaff but the
U.S. taxpayers should not have to foot this bill to the enormous financial benefit of the
pharmaceutical industry.
VI. Solutions
The court in Caronia got it wrong. In the context of drug safety and efficacy, the public
health must outweigh the free speech rights of drug manufacturers. The fix to the tension
between drug manufacturer’s first amendment rights and the public’s right to freedom from harm
lies somewhere in between full protection and complete ban.
A. Disclaimers
Disclaimers are generally accepted as less restrictive ways to limit speech but fail here
because the information which is not provided when a disclaimer is used is critical to meeting the
statutory goals of the FDCA.
Disclaimers have long been used in the food and drug realm to save otherwise false and
misleading claims. Precedents exist across the board from prescription to over-the-counter drugs
to medical devices, to nutritionals and cosmetics. The benefit of using disclaimers is that they are
less restrictive than a complete ban on speech, but in this context they would be inadequate. A
disclaimer stating “this drug use has not been evaluated by FDA” does not enable the doctor or
patient to adequately weigh the benefits and risks.
29

An example where use of a disclaimer makes sense is for Neosporin Scar Solution.
Neosporin Scar Solution is an over-the-counter medical device indicted for the treatment of
hypertrophic and keloid scars.132 The FDA mandated disclaimers, “this product is not sterile and
does not contain antibiotics”, and “do not use on open wounds or unhealed skin”, effectively
mitigate the potential that consumers may be mislead and harmed by the name of the product.133
The brand name Neosporin has long been associated with products containing the antibiotics
neomycin, bacitracin, and polymyxin B. As such, consumers may readily believe that Neosporin
Scar Solution has antibiotic properties and may be used on open wounds. Thus, the disclaimers
noted above impart critical information to consumers that help them self-diagnose, self-select,
and self-treat successfully. A disclaimer on this product which simply states, “this product has
not been reviewed and approved by the FDA” would fail as an effective disclaimer because it
does not impart the critical information need to use the product safely and effectively.
B. Clinical Evidence
Promoting on-label drug uses based on clinical evidence pursuant to an effective NDA is
not restricted. Manufacturers can avail themselves to various types of clinical evidence to get
their off-label claims approved and made on-label.134 Instead of two adequate and wellcontrolled clinical studies, they can refer to peer reviewed journal articles to gain approval for
their drugs’ off-label use.135 Although the studies described in peer review articles are typically
not scientifically robust, and studies with negative results aren’t typically submitted for peer
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review and publication, the FDA does accept peer review articles in support of approvals for
additional indications of an already approved drug.136 FDA has historically encouraged firms to
submit scientific evidence about new uses in supplemental applications with the aim of getting
the approved data in the labeling where they can do most good.137
The conduct of clinical studies and the process of scientific fact-finding is the backbone
of public health protection.138 The need for adequate and well-controlled clinical studies of new
drugs is evident from the long history of public health setbacks in the United States. It is
completely unacceptable that patients should be assuming the risk of using a drug on the basis of
deceptive promotion.139 Sound evidence of effectiveness is crucial to the FDA benefit versus risk
assessment of a particular drug but what comprises evidence of effectiveness has been the
subject of much debate. Pursuant to the Food Drug and Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997,
Congress directed the FDA to provide guidance on the “circumstances in which published matter
may be the basis for approval of a supplemental application for a new indication, and on data
requirements that will avoid duplication of previously submitted data by recognizing the
availability of data previously submitted in support of an original application to support approval
of a supplement application.”140 In short, it describes the scientific rigor needed when less than
two adequate and well-controlled studies are conducted or available.
The FDA “Guidance for Industry –Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for
Human Drugs and Biologics”, describes the qualitative and quantitative standards for supporting
136
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safety and effectiveness and encourages the submission of Supplemental New Drug Applications
(SNDAs) to add new uses to the labeling of approved drugs.141 It provides the scientific
justification for the legal standard of substantial evidence.142 As legally defined in the FDCA,
substantial evidence is “evidence consisting of adequate and well controlled investigations
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug product involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”143 In this Guidance, FDA has interpreted this statutory
requirement and described various ways to establish it.144 Pursuant to this Guidance,
manufacturers have a number of options for pursuing approval of an off-label use with less than
usual the quantity or quality of data required.145
In addition, while full reports showing safety and efficacy by the sponsor are generally
needed, the FD&C Act itself allows drugs to be approved based on less evidence.146 Although
not as scientifically robust, referencing someone else’s data and published literature reports can
support approval pursuant to a 505(b)(2) application.147 The 505(b)(2) Application results in a
comprehensive summary of the data relevant to the use in the product’s labeling and gives
doctors and their patients unbiased and objective information to weigh benefits versus risks at
point of use via the package insert which accompanies each package of the drug. FDA accepts
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this type of data and approves 505(b)(2) applications on a regular basis.148 In fact, 505(b)(2)
applications typically comprise almost half of all applications approved each year.149
VII. Conclusion
Off-label drug promotion must continue to be restricted. Statutory interpretation
concludes that Congress intended for FDA to take whatever steps necessary to protect the public
from unsafe and ineffective drugs. Off-label promotion is now constitutionally protected speech
but its restriction survives heightened scrutiny and is thus justified. Public policy mandates that
public health trump freedom of speech in the context of off-label drug advertising and promotion
of drugs. Supplemental NDAs and the 505(b)(2) mechanism already provide ways for
manufacturers to gain approval for other uses of a drug based on less than full investigations of
safety and efficacy. Pharmaceutical manufacturers need to recognize and embrace the benefits of
adequate, science-based, reliable information to meet their responsibility in ensuring that the
public gets the information they need to achieve successful outcomes when using the drugs they
promote. The appropriate way to disseminate information about off-label uses is through
independent symposia, educational sessions, and professional meetings while manufacturers
contemporaneously investigate the uses in scientifically driven adequate and well controlled
studies. In this way, patients will still have access to potentially valuable off-label uses but
harmful uses will be brought to light sooner thereby limiting their exposure to the public.
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